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Weaponisation of Capital - risk, return and resilience
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Understanding U.S. Private Credit and the Blue Owl Stress Test

Published on 24th February 2026

Over the past decade, private credit, commonly defined as non-bank lending to companies outside public bond markets, has grown into a major pillar of global finance.

Institutions such as direct lenders, business development companies (BDCs), and private credit funds provide capital to mainly middle-market companies that may be underserved by traditional banks. These loans can yield higher interest rates than publicly traded corporate bonds or syndicated bank loans, and the asset class has attracted a flood of capital looking for yield in a low-rate environment. 

This rapid expansion has also led to rising scrutiny and the recent turmoil surrounding Blue Owl Capital, one of the largest BDC private capital managers in the United States, highlights key structural vulnerabilities in the sector -particularly regarding liquidity and valuation transparency.

 
Blue Owl’s Liquidity Squeeze and Redemption Freeze

On the 19 February 2026, Blue Owl Capital announced it would sell approximately $1.4 billion in assets from multiple credit funds and permanently halt quarterly redemptions for one of its retail-focused private credit vehicles, Blue Owl Capital Corp II (OBDC II). Rather than allowing investors to withdraw capital quarterly, the firm said it would distribute proceeds episodically as assets are sold down over time. 

Shares of Blue Owl and other alternative asset managers retreated on the news, as the wider private credit complex woke to the prospect that funds with illiquid underlying loans might struggle to meet investor redemption requests in stressed conditions. This drew attention to the tension between illiquid loan portfolios and semi-liquid fund structures that promise periodic liquidity but sit atop long-dated, hard-to-sell assets. 

The specific problems at Blue Owl stem from several pressures:

  • Elevated redemption requests from investors wanting to exit semi-liquid BDCs, particularly in vehicles marketed to wealthy individuals who historically provided a steady capital base. Redemption pressure started building up in 2025 where OBDC II faced $150m in redemptions over the first 9 months of 2026, a 20% YoY increase.
  • Asset concentration and valuation risk, especially exposure to technology and software loans, a sector that has suffered significant market stress and that made up the bulk of the company’s lending portfolio. Illiquid, long-dated corporate loans packaged inside a vehicle offering periodic quarterly redemptions to retail investors together with doubts cast on the asset valuations led to retail-oriented redemptions, creating a classic run dynamic. 
  • Failed strategic moves, including the abandonment of a planned merger between two Blue Owl funds (ODBC and ODBC II) amid investor backlash due to valuation spreads. Analysts and commentators described the episode as a reminder that private credit’s structural flexibility and its ability to lend where banks have pulled back is a double-edged sword, especially when looking at BDC structures with long-dated loans as the market reprices risk or liquidity evaporates. Critics also question whether some funds have adequately modeled stress scenarios for redemptions or transparently communicated the illiquidity of their holdings. 

 

Broader Market Implications

Blue Owl’s decision has unsettled investors across the private credit landscape, reinforcing that the asset class is not immune to cyclical risks or sudden shifts in sentiment. While many private credit vehicles still draw net inflows, default rates among private borrowers and persistent redemption pressures suggest that liquidity mismatches are not isolated to Blue Owl’s funds. 

This dynamic has reignited debates about appropriate investor protections and the wisdom of offering quasi-liquid structures for fundamentally illiquid assets, an issue regulators and market participants are likely to revisit.

 

The Case for Short-Term Merchant Cash Advance and Purchase of Future Receipts Funds

Against the backdrop of private credit stress, alternative short-term strategies such as Merchant Cash Advance (MCA) funds and Purchase of future receipts (PFR) vehicles have attracted attention from investors seeking exposure to credit-like returns but with different risk and liquidity profiles.

 

What Are Merchant Cash Advances and Purchase of Future Receipts?

merchant cash advance is a financing arrangement where an investor or fund provides a lump sum to a small or mid-sized business in exchange for a share of its future receivables (often credit/debit card sales). Unlike traditional loans, MCAs are repaid as a percentage of daily or weekly revenue until a predetermined amount is collected; they are technically purchases of future receivables rather than interest-bearing debt. The funds are generally deployed towards shorter duration investment and can hence provide liquidity when need arises as opposed to funds such as Blue Owl’s.

Funds that specialize in MCAs or receivables purchases aggregate a diversified portfolio of such advances across numerous businesses. Because repayment is tied to revenue flows instead of fixed interest schedules, the instruments behave differently from traditional credit and often complete repayment within a relatively short horizon (commonly under one year). 

 

Benefits for Investors

MCA and future receivable-backed funds offer attractive risk-return profiles, particularly in volatile environments:

  1. Shorter Duration and Cash Flow Focus
    Investors in future receivables strategies generally benefit from short investment horizons relative to traditional private credit loans, which often span several years. Faster turnover can enhance liquidity and reduce exposure to prolonged credit cycles.
  2. Return Tied to Real-Time Revenue Streams
    Repayments come from a portion of merchants’ ongoing revenue rather than scheduled interest payments. This means investors benefit directly from operational performance and can see repayments complete faster in growing businesses.
  3. Diversification Beyond Traditional Credit Risk
    Receivable-based strategies tend to source returns from a broad base of operating businesses, often outside sectors concentrated in private credit funds (e.g., tech lending). That diversification can reduce systematic risk compared with concentrated loan books.
  4. Potential Yield Premiums in Short-Term Credit
    Because MCAs and receivable purchases carry higher risk of non-payment compared to traditional bank loans, they often offer higher yield premiums than similarly short-term instruments; investors willing to assume that risk may achieve attractive risk-adjusted returns.
  5. Less Interest Rate Sensitivity
    Shorter maturities and revenue-linked repayments mean these strategies are inherently less sensitive to interest rate shifts than longer-term private credit loans, which can be re-priced or stressed by rate volatility.
  6. Improved Liquidity Through Fund Structures
    Some investment vehicles designed for MCAs or receivable purchases are structured to offer more frequent distributions and shorter lock-up periods than typical private credit funds, enabling more responsive portfolio management.

These features make receivable-backed strategies especially relevant at times when concerns about liquidity, mark-to-market valuations, or redemption constraints constrain confidence in traditional private credit vehicles.

 

The Stewards Private Credit Fund (SPCF), a side-by-side comparative analysis.

 The table below summarises the key structural, operational, and risk differences between Blue Owl OBDC II and Stewards Inc. (SPCF’s Lender):

Distinction 1 - We Are Not a BDC, and We Have No Redemption Window

OBDC II's crisis originated from an inherent structural tension: investors in a non-traded BDC expected the ability to redeem their capital on a quarterly basis from a portfolio of long-dated, illiquid corporate loans. When too many investors exercised this right simultaneously, the fund faced a classic liquidity mismatch.

Stewards Inc. is a publicly traded operating company. Our investors access and exit their investment through the open equity market - the same mechanism available for any publicly listed company. There is no redemption gate, no tender offer mechanism, and no structural incentive for simultaneous investor exit that could destabilise our balance sheet.

Distinction 2 - Our Borrowers Are Fundamentally Different

OBDC II lent primarily to large, leveraged US middle-market corporations - many in the technology and software sector - where debt serviceability is sensitive to rising interest rates, revenue multiples, and refinancing conditions. These are complex, often covenant-light structures where distress can be systemic.

Stewards serves small and medium-sized businesses across the United States. Our SME borrowers are operationally simpler, carry shorter debt tenors, and repay from direct operating revenues. The granularity of our SME portfolio - spread across many borrowers, sectors, and geographies - provides inherent diversification that large-cap leveraged lending portfolios cannot match.

Distinction 3 - Our Loan Tenors Eliminate Duration Risk

One of the most dangerous features of the OBDC II structure was the combination of long-dated assets with short-dated investor liquidity expectations. Loans in a typical corporate direct lending portfolio may mature over three to seven years, while investor redemption rights were offered quarterly.

Stewards' SME financing products are predominantly short-tenor instruments - merchant cash advances, revenue-based financing, equipment loans, and lines of credit - that are designed to self-liquidate rapidly. This rapid capital recycling means that our balance sheet is continuously refreshed by repayments, eliminating the duration mismatch that proved fatal for OBDC II.

Distinction 4 - We Have No Valuation Opacity

A significant driver of investor concern at Blue Owl was scepticism around how illiquid corporate loans are marked (valued) on the balance sheet. In private credit, marks are frequently model-derived estimates rather than observable market prices. When Blue Owl's management team stated confidence in their valuations, the market remained unconvinced - prompting continued redemption pressure.

Stewards employs technology-driven, AI-assisted underwriting and portfolio monitoring. Our SME loan book consists largely of instruments with clear, contractual repayment structures and well-defined credit indicators drawn from real-time business performance data. This transparency in valuation methodology is a structural advantage over traditional private credit mark estimation.

Distinction 5 - Our Governance, Disclosure, and Growth Trajectory Are Aligned

OBDC II's situation was compounded by a series of governance missteps - including a proposed merger that could have imposed 20% losses on investors, followed by a reversal and wind-down announcement. These events eroded trust and accelerated redemptions.

Stewards Inc. is on a forward growth trajectory. We are actively pursuing a Nasdaq uplisting, which requires adherence to rigorous financial reporting, governance, and transparency standards. Our Private Credit Fund is listed on Bloomberg and Morningstar. Our management team has maintained consistent strategic messaging. We have no restructuring overhang, no failed transaction to unwind, and no investor base seeking simultaneous exit.

Conclusion

The recent stress at Blue Owl Capital underscores how liquidity mismatches, opaque valuations, and investor redemption dynamics can collide in private credit markets, turning what once looked like steady yield into a source of volatility and investor anxiety. The episode highlights broader vulnerabilities in semi-liquid credit structures and the risks of stretching investor expectations without equally robust liquidity mechanisms.

But the Private Credit Market is not monolithic.

There is a material difference between:

  • Large-scale BDC vehicles offering retail investors periodic redemptions from illiquid leveraged loan portfolios - the category where OBDC II sits; and
  • Technology-enabled, operationally disciplined SME lending platforms - the category where Stewards operates.

As such, short-term private credit strategies such as merchant cash advance and purchase of future receivable based funds, like the Stewards Private Credit Fund, offer a differentiated approach that emphasizes shorter duration, direct cash flow linkage, and an alternative risk profile. While not devoid of risk, MCA strategies can deliver compelling benefits for investors seeking yield outside traditional private credit’s long-dated, illiquid loans.

Ultimately, diversification across risk structures and maturities, combined with deep understanding of underlying cash flow mechanics, remains crucial for navigating today’s complex fixed income and credit landscape.

The demand for SME financing in the United States continues to grow as traditional banks reduce their small business lending activity. Stewards is positioned to capture this structural opportunity, supported by proprietary technology, diversified product offerings, and a disciplined underwriting culture that is distinct from the large-cap leveraged lending world.

Understanding U.S. Private Credit and the Blue Owl Stress Test
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